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Israel & the Palestinians: The Conflict in Contextvieuxcmaq, Miércoles, Enero 31, 2001 - 12:00 (Analyses)
Maté Aaron (aaronjmate@yahoo.com)
I thought I'd put this up for those wanting background To date, the recent confrontations in Israel have claimed over 300 lives, including 30 children. The horrible events, marked by Israel's massive use of force, condemmed internationally, and the large death toll, overwhelmingly Palestinian, follow the clear themes established over the course of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian civilians are subjected to the force of a much stronger Israeli occupier, who denies them their basic rights in the continued expansion of Israel's borders and strength. The matter dates back to the establishment of Israel. Early Zionist leaders understood very well that their goal for a Jewish state in Palestine could be realized only at expense of the indigeneous Palestinian people, who had lived there for thousands of years. Vladimir Jabotinski, a prominent right wing Zionist leader, noted in 1923 that "Zionism is a colonizing adventure, and therefore it stands or falls by the question of armed force." David-Ben Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister, explained privately in 1938 that "we should not ignore the truth amongst ourselves.... politically we are the aggressors and they defend themselves... The country is theirs because they inhabit it, whereas we want to come here and settle down, and in their view we want to take away from their country, while we are still outside." These ambitions were pursued with clear force, leading up to the declaration of Israel in 1948, when the United Nations partitioned the land of Palestine into seperate Palestinian and Israeli states. A war ensued between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries, ending in armistice agreements that divided the partitioned land for Palestine between Israel and Jordan. The Palestinians were excluded from the arrangements. The war caused the majority of their population to flee their homes, a reaction largely to the campaigns of Israeli military forces, whose stated aims were "the destruction of Arab villages" near Jewish settlements and "the evacuation of their inhabitants, the siege of Arab cities that were not located inside the Jewish State according to the UN resolution and direct actions against Arab targets in Western Palestine, outside the borders of the Jewish state" (Israeli military historian Uri Millstein). Israel expanded further during the 1967 war, conquering Syria's Golan Heights and Egypt's Sinai desert, and, most crucially, Jordan's share of partitioned Palestine, home to 700,000 Palestinians. Israel's military strikes on its neighbouring countries were originally denied, yet now commonly described as a pre-emptive act of self-defense against impending Arab attacks. Yet Israeli generals, such as Ezer Weizman, former Commander of the Air Force, have admitted that such is a "myth", the reality being that "there was no threat of destruction" from the Arab states, the attacks on their land nonetheless legitimate in that they enabled Israel to "exist according to the scale, spirit and quality she now embodies." General Matityahu Peled, dismissed the notion that the Arab states "were capable of threatening Israel's existence", opining that such a view "not only an insults the intelligence of anyone capable of analysing this kind of situation, but is an insult to Zahal [the Israeli army]." The occupation has brought the obvious consequences to the Palestinian people, their lives subject to the harsh constraints standard of colonial rule. Palestinian villages and towns are hampered by border closures and curfews, their resources and fertile land under control of the occupying military force. In many areas, it is illegal for a Palestinian to dig a well or tend fertile land, while their area's water flows back into Israel, or the neighbouring Jewish settlements, some of which house green fields and swimming pools. Their scarce land is constantly eroded, their homes and trees demolished, while Jewish settlements continue to expand further into Palestinian territory. The situation is much worse for the millions of Palestinians who are forced to live in refugee camps in bordering Arab countries. The 1967 conquests had another significant outcome, as the United States became Israel's main ally, supplying it with enormous military, diplomatic and economic support. U.S. officials were greatly impressed by Israel's use of force to crush its Arab enemies, whom Washington had long been wary of, given their tendency to regard their region's vast oil reserves as something they should have some control over. Israel could play a great role in resolving this problem, its military "local cops on the beat" (Melvin Laird, Richard Nixon's Defense Secretary), subordinated to "inhibit and contain those irresponsible and radical elements in certain Arab states...who, were they free to do so, would pose a grave threat indeed to our principle sources of petroleum" (former U.S. Senator Henry Jackson) or, more accurately,"the vast wealth they yield," as Noam Chomsky points out. This is the basic premise for the relationship between Israel and the United States, an alliance that has dominated the region's affairs for over thirty years, with significant consequences to its peace and security. Contrary to standard analysis, such efforts have only been extended during the period of the "peace process", the American-mediated initiatives at a diplomatic settlement to the conflict. Under the settlement, developed and partially implemented since the Oslo Accords of 1993, Israel's military forces are to withdraw from some areas of high Palestinian density, control handed over to the Palestinian Authority. The withdrawal is only partial; in several areas, military forces are only redeployed to other parts populated by Israeli settlements. Israel is to retain full control over borders, water resources, roads, and most usable land. The new Palestinian state is to be divided into four or five cantons within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, each disconnected from the other by surrounding Israeli roads and settlements. Control over the Gaza Strip remains unclear, although Israel is expected to retain the southern coastal region, as well as a military outpost to the north of the area. In other words, the basic tenets of the "peace process" conform to the established themes of rejectionist Israeli-U.S. policy mentioned above. It formalizes a full rejection of international law, and the consensus of much of the world community (with one notable exception), which, among many, has called for full Israeli withdrawal from the territory it conquered in 1967 under UN Resolution 242. It offers no compensation to the Palestinian refugees who have lost their homes and property to Israeli expansion, losses now valued at $6 billion U.S. (excluding interest). The settlements, built up on the annexed land to create a Jewish presence amongst the enclosed Palestinian population, in full violation of international law, remain in place, with no constraints on their continued expansion. Thus far, this is a role that Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat's security forces have carried out pretty successfully. The matter has long been recognized by human rights organizations, who annually condemn the PA for unlawful measures of rule, including harsh torture. The brutality of Arafat's regime is no doubt a tribute to the effective tutelage of the CIA, who have worked closely with the PA forces in security training and cooperation, another fruitful partership to emerge from the peace process. With the recent outbreak of violence and protest in the Occupied Territories, however, Arafat's ability to control his people has come into question. In response, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak has expressed his willingness to pursue other alternatives, should the U.S.-Israel designs for "peace" do not come to pass. The New York Times (Oct. 22) reports that Israel is considering a unilateral seperation, in which it "would separate by creating its own borders, thereby carving out a Palestinian state as well." For the Palestinians, "separation would be a kind of extended border closure, in which Palestinian areas would be sealed off, checkpoints reinforced and the movement of goods and labor severely restricted." The enclosure "would be economically devastating for the Palestinians", who greatly rely on work in Israel. Further, an added measure under consideration is "disentangling the water and electricity systems, which would inflict severe hardships on the Palestinians." Of course, in Israel there are objections to this plan. Most vocally, Israeli "business leaders on both sides argued" that "the high-tech Israeli economy and the low-wage Palestinian work force made an ideal marriage," one that would be endangered by a unilateral separation. That such measures, cutting off completely the already meagre amount of water, electricity and other requisites of basic human necessity allotted to the Palestinian people would be "economically devastating" and cause "severe hardships" for them is a matter that deserves little consideration, secondary to concerns over the state of the "ideal marriage" between Israeli industry and exploited Palestinian labourers. It is worth noting that such proposals do not vary considerably from those presented to Arafat at this past summer's Camp David summit. Mediated by President Bill Clinton, the meetings were undertaken to work out the final details of the peace process initiated at Oslo. The remaining issues centered around the status of Jerusalem, considered the capital of both Muslims and Jews, and the center for Palestinian daily life. Israel-U.S. proposals were rejected by Arafat, who, as weak as he has become, could not accept what was a virtual surrender on the issue. Having already squandered his people's national home to a Bantustan-style settlement, he could not accept the deal, which would give the Palestinians jurisdiction over Abu Dis, a neighbouring village on the outskirts of Jerusalem. To accomodate the Palestinian claim to the holy city and historic capital, Abu Dis would be renamed Al Quuds, the Arabic meaning for "Jerusalem". Arafat's rejection caused a fury in the mainstrean press, the hysteria peaking during the recent confrontations. As the unrest in the occupied territories persisted, commentators blamed Arafat for his selfish rejection of Israel's "significant concessions", which, as usual, "were never enough to satisfy the Palestinians." (Lawrence S. Eagleburger, NYT, Oct. 1). Others marvelled at how "Israel gave in to most Palestinian demands, understanding that a strong peace is a much better alternative than a strong war." (Avraham Burg, NYT, Oct 4) No compensation for refugees, a divided and weak state with no control over water and other resources was "the most generous compromise terms possible under current political circumstances" the editors of the New York Times proclaimed, criticizing Arafat's "unhelpful rigidity" (Sept. 30). The analysis is in fact highly accurate, although with one crucial disclaimer, which the editors failed to include: the harsh constraints that exist on what is "possible" within the narrow spectrum of U.S.-Israel policy, developed over the past thirty years, and highly recognizable to anyone willing to see. With respect to Jerusalem, Arafat's rejection of the "creative solution" to rename a neighbouring village its meaning in Arabic stemmed from his inability to "break free of several generations of Palestinian ideology about the sanctity of sovereignty over Jerusalem" (Marc Lacey and David Sanger, NYT, July 26). As always, there are lessons to be learned. William Saffire (NYT, Oct. 12) warns that Israeli leaders now know that their benevolence is not reciprocated, as "Barak's urge to compromise was taken by Arabs to be appeasement, a sign of weakness." Future presidents can learn from the example of Clinton, who in his desire "to make history in the role of peacemaker led him to position the U.S. a broker, equally trusting of both sides", only to be betrayed by the stubborn Palestinian leader, who "led Clinton down the garden path, gobbling up brokered concessions and giving nothing in return." Here in Canada, the prevailing cynicism was similar, at times even harsher. Marcus Gee, the Globe and Mail's international correspondent, in an article entitled "Palestinians squander their freedom" (Oct. 26), scolded the Palestinian people, who "are feeling good these days", the past "few weeks of rioting and mayhem having done wonders for their self-esteem" -- an interesting observation: one would think that losing over a hundred lives, 30 of them children, to military attacks and living under virtual captivity by border enclosure would have other effects. Nonetheless, they are "fools", "[having] thrown away their best chance at freedom in fifty years", he writes, in a standard refrain of the gross distortions of the actual record. "The fools", he repeats, concluding bitterly. Others laid the blame elsewhere. As tensions swelled, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution condemning Israel for "acts of violence and excessive use of force" against Palestinian civilians (the U.S. abstained, a reversal of standard policy to veto any critical motion against their client state, for which there have been countless), while Amnesty International noted Israel's "punitive attacks during incidents where there was no imminent danger to life", using "helicopter gunships to fire on Palestinian civilians, including children, some of whom have reportedly been killed or injured as a result.". AI's criticism came in the context of a condemnation of the U.S., who had just recently provided Israel with 35 Blackhawk helicopters, at a cost $525 million. The sale, the highest in many years, received virtually no press coverage in any of the mainstream U.S. publications. While the visit of Ariel Sharon, the right-wing Israeli leader, associated with numerous Above all, the recent wave of violence and anger is likely best understood by recognizing Palestinian frustration and despair at a long history of occupation and suppression, a matter that has only worsened during the period of a "peace process" that was supposed to improve their plight. This is a fact ignored with great effort, attention and blame directed to the Palestinian "fools", who "squander their freedom" by not accepting the Bantustan-style arrangements intended for them by U.S.-Israel design. So long as these principles continue to dominate the policies of those in power, and of the devoted adherents who follow them, it is unrealistic to think of a true and just peace in the region. |
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