Intensified armed struggle making NPA stronger--CPP

Anonyme, Wednesday, March 29, 2006 - 13:27

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP-CC) today said that the New People's Army (NPA) is becoming stronger by intensifying the revolutionary armed struggle.

Information Bureau
Communist Party of the Philippines

Intensified armed struggle making NPA stronger--CPP
March 28, 2006

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP-CC) today said that the New People's Army (NPA) is becoming stronger by intensifying the revolutionary armed struggle.

In a statement markng the 37th anniversary of the NPA, the CPP-CC said the NPA now operates in more than 120 guerrilla zones covering 800 municipalities in 70 of 79 provinces. Each guerrilla front has an optimal strength of one company with high-powered rifles, divisible into three platoons with one serving as the center of gravity.

The CPP-CC also belied the boasts by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) that through Lambat Bitag I, II and III they succeeded in bringing down the armed strength of the NPA from the level of 25,000 to 6,000 from the late part of the 1980s to the early 1990s.

"This is not true," the CPP-CC said. "In 1986, the NPA had only 6,100 high-powered rifles."

Presently, the nationwide strength of the NPA full-time fighters is in the thousands, the CPP-CC said. It is augmented by the far more numerous people's militia which act as the police force in the localities and by the self-defense units based in the mass organizations.

"The NPA can readily expand upon the seizure of arms from the enemy troops through ambushes, raids and arrest operations."


Information Bureau
Communist Party of the Philippines

CPP Central Committee issues 10-point guideline for accelerating NPA offensives
March 28, 2006

On the ocassion of the 37th anniversary of the New People's Army (NPA), the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines issued today a 10-point guideline for the NPA to accelerate tactical offensives "to weaken and cause the ouster of the Arroyo regime" and "strengthen the revolutionary forces and advance the people's democratic revolution against the entire ruling system."

According to the CPP-CC, the revolutionary forces are currently developing "the middle phase of the strategic defensive by expanding, consolidating and increasing the number of guerrilla fronts, multiplying our combat platoons and employing them against the enemy frequently and on a nationwide scale in order to wipe out and disarm the enemy.

1. Develop the operational commands of the NPA at the levels of the guerrilla front, province and region in order to overcome the downside of having long focused on mass work and having become accustomed to the mode of deployment and ways of the armed propaganda squads and teams, which have been described as conservatism and roving rebel band tendency or mentality. ... Have the flexibility to employ small teams and squads (for sniping, sabotage and punitive operations) as well as oversized platoons and companies, depending on the nature and requirements of a mission.

2. Maintain the fighting initiative against the enemy. We can do so because we have the ample mass base from which to launch our tactical offensives and within which we can maneuver, whatever are the tactics needed, be it of concentration, dispersal or shifting. Always observe the enemy forces to discover their weakest points. We can choose the time and place for concentrating our force and deal lethal blows on the target. We can compel the enemy forces to make mistakes and become confused on how to deploy his strategic and tactical units.

3. Fight only battles that we can win. We must not enter into any indecisive battle, which we are not sure of winning. We must avoid being put into purely defensive battles. We must conduct ambushes, raids and arrest operations in which we have the upperhand by concentrating a superior force and taking advantage of the element of surprise. We must do so at such a rapid rate on a wide scale that the enemy cannot know where and how to seize the initiative.

4. When the enemy force advances with a superior force raring for a fight, we must not meet it headlong with an NPA force that it can easily see, pin down and crush. We can inflict casualties on an advancing enemy force by using landmines, small teams and snipers. When the enemy force camps, we can undertake harassment actions and keep him from taking any rest. When it retreats, we know where to hit it hard on the basis of the information that we have gathered about its movement.

5. Continue the nationwide tactical offensives. We do so under broad guidelines from the Party center and national command of the NPA. In consonance with the long running policy of decentralized operations, the NPA in the various guerrilla fronts, provinces and regions must avail of a wide range of flexible tactics, using various types of offensive units and weapons. There are tactical offensives well within the jurisdiction and capacity of the NPA at a certain level of command. Proposals for tactical offensives requiring a larger force than available at a certain level can be made to a higher level of command, with sufficient intelligence build-up and timely reconnaissance of the target provided.

6. Increase the tactical offensives for seizing weapons. We do so through raids, ambushes and arrest operations against units and elements of the military, police, paramilitary and private security agencies. We need more weapons in order to build more fighting units of the NPA and to raise the level of the people's war. As the repression intensifies in the white areas, we expect to integrate more Party cadres and members and mass activists in the NPA.

7. Give first place to tactics of annihilation because it yields us the most arms. But when the smoke of battle clears up, we treat well the enemy survivors and give medical treatment to the wounded. In the course of battle, the enemy personnel can be allowed to surrender. Whenever possible, we do not fire at an enemy unit or element that can be disarmed without firing a shot.

8. Make the enemy side pay heavily through attritive actions. We must observe and study the lines and means of transport, installations, depots and other facilities that are vital to the counterrevolutionary war effort of the enemy. We must subject these to attacks as often as necessary in order to weaken and destroy the war capability of the enemy forces and to compel them to go on the defensive, put more personnel on guard duty and lessen the number of combat effectives for deployment in the field.

9. Disintegrate the enemy personnel through various tactics. We must ensure that our revolutionary propaganda reach the enemy troops. We remind them of the oppressed and exploited conditions of their families and the toiling masses and persuade them to join the armed revolution. We offer truce, alliance and cooperation against the hated Arroyo regime. We spread the word that we do not attack enemy units that show proof of being against the regime. We respect the surrender of enemy personnel even in the midst of battle. We treat our captives with leniency in accordance with international humanitarian law.

10. Give no quarters to the worst and most notorious among the reactionaries: those most culpable for directing and carrying out repression, human rights violations, plunder, destruction of the environment and the drug trade. Upon complaint of the victims, the Party or the pertinent organ of political power, the people's court must issue the warrants of arrest, search and seizure for the NPA to enforce. In case the criminal suspect is well armed and dangerous or is surrounded by armed cohorts, the NPA arresting team is authorized to use the necessary amount of force or to give battle in order to subdue any resistance.

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